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Abstract: The European sovereign-debt crisis began in Greece when the government 
announced in December, 2009, that its debt reached 121% of GDP (or 300 billion euros) 
and its 2009 budget deficit was 12.7% of GDP, four times the level allowed by the 
Maastricht Treaty. The Greek crisis soon spread to other Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) countries, notably Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy. Using quarterly data for the  
2000–2011 period, we implement a panel-vector autoregressive (PVAR) model for  
11 EMU countries to examine the extent to which a rise in a country’s bond-yield spread or 
debt-to-GDP ratio affects another EMU countries’ fiscal and macroeconomic outcomes. To 
distinguish between interdependence and contagion among EMU countries, we compare 
results obtained for the pre-crisis period (2000–2007) with the crisis period (2008–2011) 
and control for global risk aversion. 
Keywords: Panel VAR; sovereign debt crisis; euro area; contagion 
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1. Introduction  
The Euro debt crisis threatens to derail the global recovery following the financial crisis of 2008. 
This paper examines the transmission of a potential sovereign debt default by contagion in the Euro 
Area. The European sovereign-debt crisis started in Greece when the government announced in 
December, 2009, that its debt reached 300 bn euros and its budget deficit for 2009 was 12.7%, four 
times the level allowed by the Maastricht Treaty. The crisis soon affected other Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) countries, notably Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy. Are the refinancing problems of 
these countries only due to changes in their own economic fundamentals? Are developments in Greece 
affecting the market’s assessment of other EMU members and causing contagion?  
Contagion occurs when financial or macroeconomic imbalances (shocks) create a spillover risk 
beyond that explained by economic fundamentals [1,2]. Contagion differs from macroeconomic 
interdependence among countries in that transmission of risk to other countries is different under 
“normal” economic times. Forbes [2] defines contagion as spillovers resulting from extreme negative 
effects. If co-movements of markets are similarly high during non-crisis periods and crisis periods, 
then there is only evidence of strong economic linkages between these economies [3]. At the center of 
the Greek debt crisis is a fiscal crisis stemming from corruption, an inefficient tax system and a bloated 
public sector. One could argue that the Greek phenomenon is independent from the overall European 
fiscal situation and particular to Greece. Yet, the downgrading of the Greek credit rating was soon 
followed by similar downgrades for other EMU countries: Ireland, Portugal and Spain, notably.  
Several studies [4–6] empirically examine the nature of credit shocks and the mechanism by which 
credit shocks propagate from one country to another. One path of propagation of a shock is through 
trade linkages; another is through international capital markets. Some institutional investors (such as 
pension funds) or banks are required to hold bonds with a minimum rating in their portfolio. For 
banks, often holding bonds with a minimum rating is mandatory to comply with capital requirements 
or collateral when borrowing from the central bank. Therefore, if a country’s debt is downgraded, 
these institutions will have to reduce their holdings of debt, which could cause bond yields to rise. 
Moreover, Euro-area banks hold Euro-area government debt as a diversification strategy; however, these 
banks are then exposed to changes in the value of government debt. This means that banks are not only 
exposed to domestic government risk, but also risk emanating from other countries in the Euro-area [7]. 
An increase in perceived global risk magnifies the importance of fiscal imbalances, such as excessive 
debt or budget deficits, which leads investors to discriminate between less fiscally-disciplined countries 
(such as Greece, Spain, Portugal or Italy] and more disciplined countries (such as Germany or the 
Netherlands). Consequently, sovereign yield spreads rise [6]. Cochrane [8] argues that the contagion 
effect is dependent on whether the Euro-area will shield investors from potential losses from other 
periphery countries, so investors are closely watching the Greek bail-out.  
There are several approaches to examine the spillover of shocks from one country or region to 
another. Some studies use global vector autoregressions (GVARs) to examine the dynamic spillover 
effects of sovereign debt [9,5] across countries. The GVAR approach is a multi-country VAR in which 
one estimates a VAR model for each country included in the sample. In addition to the lagged values 
of every country’s variables in each equation, each VAR includes global variables, which are 
constructed as the weighted averages of the variables of the other countries included in the analysis. 
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Typically, the coefficient on the foreign variables are weighted by bilateral-trade or weighted to 
capture international financial exposure. Another approach uses panel VARs [10] to examine the 
transmission of shocks internationally. “This technique combines the traditional VAR approach, which 
treats all the variables in the system as endogenous, with the panel-data approach, which allows for 
unobserved individual heterogeneity.” ([11], p. 193). Panel VARs differ from GVARs in that the 
coefficients on the foreign variables are restricted to zero and only one set of coefficients are estimated 
(not one for each country, as in the GVAR). Structural vector error-correction models [4] are also used 
to model the propagation of such shocks. Mink and De Haan [12] use a different approach, an event 
study, to examine how financial markets respond to news on developments in Greece. 
Several papers have examined the relationship of government debt on long-term interest rates [13,14] 
and the spillover effect of rising debt on interest rates in other countries [9]. These studies find a 
significant, positive relationship of government debt increases on the long-term interest rate. Empirical 
evidence is, however, mixed, since the effects of increases in government debt can be offset by private 
saving and foreign saving via international capital markets, or if the debt is considered high quality, it 
could indicate increasing liquidity. Caporale and Girardi [9] find asymmetries between a debt/GDP 
shock originating in “core” countries compared to “periphery” countries.1
Using a panel-vector autoregressive (PVAR) model, we assess the extent to which rising debt to 
GDP ratios and government-bond yield spreads
 They find that a debt/shock 
originating from France or Germany causes the long-term interest rate to fall for other Euro-area 
countries, suggesting a liquidity benefit to other Euro-area countries. However, the same shock 
originating from the “periphery” causes long-term interest rates in other Euro-area countries to rise 
slightly, indicating that default risk in the periphery is increasing borrowing costs for most. De Grauwe 
and Ji [15] find evidence of a self-fulfilling rise in sovereign risk spreads emanating from the periphery 
compared to core countries in the Euro-area and other “stand alone” countries that can issue debt in 
currencies controlled by their own central bank. Specifically, the debt-to-GDP and debt-to-tax revenue 
ratios are significant in explaining sovereign risk spreads in the Euro-area, but not “stand-alone” 
countries, such as the U.S. or UK, which suggests that countries that do not control their own money 
supplies are vulnerable to rising debt levels. 
2
                                                 
1 The core countries are France, Germany, Belgium, Luxemburg, Italy, Austria, Finland and the Netherlands. The 
periphery countries are Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain. 
 in EMU countries are due to changes in countries’ 
economic fundamentals and/or contagion from other troubled EMU economies. In addition to 
analyzing contamination from Greece, we also assess whether contagion from other larger southern 
countries, notably Spain and Italy, pose a bigger risk on the remaining Euro-area. This study 
contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, in addition to debt-to-GDP shock, we 
examine shocks to sovereign spreads (other papers only analyze the determinants of sovereign 
spreads). Second, to distinguish interdependence from contagion, we compare the IRF’s obtained from 
the crisis period (2008–2011) with those obtained for the pre-crisis period (2000–2007). We also 
control for global uncertainty (global risk aversion) in addition to other economic fundamentals to 
better isolate risk originating from the peripheral countries in the Euro-area [16]. Finally, we measure 
2 Throughout this paper, we will use the terms government-bond yield spread, sovereign spread and risk premium 
interchangeably. 
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the sovereign risk-spread relative to the U.S., so we can retain Germany in our sample and examine the 
response of Euro-area countries to an isolated shock originating in Greece and other peripheral 
countries using the PVAR approach.  
We find that, in the pre-crisis period, an increase in one country’s sovereign spread increases other 
countries’ sovereign spreads, but does not affect their debt-to-GDP ratios, thus indicating economic 
interdependence among EMU countries. Following 2008, the same shock to sovereign spreads has a 
large effect on countries’ debt-to-GDP ratios, if the shock stems from Greece or Spain, suggesting 
contagion. When the shocks affect debt-to-GDP ratios, we do not find evidence of contagion. 
However, whether the shock improves or worsens the other EMU economies depends on the debt level 
of the country “shocked”. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the PVAR model and 
the data that we use to analyze whether a shock to an EMU country’s sovereign spread or debt-to-GDP 
ratio affects the other EMU countries. We discuss in Section 3 the impulse response functions obtained 
from the aforementioned shocks. In Section 4, we make concluding remarks. 
2. Data and Estimation Methodology 
We estimate our impulse response functions from a six-variable PVAR in log-levels. Estimating the 
VAR in levels has a few advantages, including the ease of interpreting the impulse response 
coefficients, as well as avoiding some misspecification issues related to estimating a VAR in first 
differences or taking into account issues of cointegration (see [17−19] for discussion on these points). 
For example, Ludvigson [20] notes that even in the case where some variables may be non-stationary, 
a VAR in levels will have standard asymptotic distributions [21]. Similarly, Ramaswamy and Sløk [17] 
measure the effects of monetary policy on European Union countries in addition to the United 
Kingdom using a VAR estimated in levels (they also provide discussion on the benefits of estimating 
the VAR in levels; see ([17], pp. 379–80), in particular). Ashley and Verbrugge [22] show that even in 
the presence of non-stationarity and cointegration, estimating a VAR in levels provides impulse 
response functions that are robust to those specification issues (see also [23] for Monte Carlo evidence 
related to this point).  
The PVAR approach has several advantages over individual country VARs. First, we gain degrees 
of freedom by analyzing a panel of countries. Further, we can better model the spillovers from one 
country to another, since the panel approach captures country-level heterogeneity.  
The PVAR model is given by: 
𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐴𝐴(𝐿𝐿)𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (1) 
where 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is a matrix of endogenous variables, 𝐴𝐴(𝐿𝐿) is a matrix polynomial in the lag operator, L, with 
country i=1,…11. 
In the baseline specification, the vector, Z, includes the following variables: 
• the debt-to-GDP ratio3
                                                 
3 We ran the same VAR with the debt-to-GDP ratio in first differences, and the IRFs were similar to those presented 
below. We discuss more sensitivity analysis later in this section. Alternatively, the deficit-to-GDP ratio could be used to 
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• the rate of GDP growth 
• the rate of inflation (measured as the percentage change in Harmonized Consumer  
Price indices)  
• the countries’ bond-yield spread measured as the difference between a country’s ten-year bond 
rate and the rate on the ten-year U.S. Treasury note 
• the global risk aversion index 
• and the Country of Interest Sovereign Risk Spread/or debt-to-GDP ratio. 
While several papers measure the sovereign spread as the difference between an EMU country’s 
ten-year bond rate and the rate on the ten-year German bonds [3,15,24], we choose to use the U.S. 
Treasury note as the risk-free asset benchmark in order to retain Germany in our analysis. How we 
construct sovereign spreads should not affect our results, given the high correlation between the two 
measures. Indeed, the correlation between country interest rate spreads measured against the German 
bond and spreads measured against the U.S. interest rate is 0.973. During the crisis, this correlation 
increases to 0.99. Therefore, in order to keep Germany in our sample, we use the U.S. Treasury note 
instead of the German bond. Our sample consists of 11 EMU countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Ireland, Italy, Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain4
Before we discuss the global risk aversion (GRA) and country of interest variables included in our 
PVAR and performing a more rigorous econometric analysis, it is useful to look at the evolution of EMU 
countries’ debt-to-GDP ratios and bond-yield-spreads over time. Figure 1 displays the debt-to-GDP 
ratios of the original 11 EMU countries. To make the graph easier to read, we split the countries between 
the periphery (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) and the core (the other seven countries). The red line 
captures the Stability and Growth Pact limit on government debt set at 60% of GDP. First, it is worth 
noting that, even before the financial and economic crisis of 2008, only four countries maintained  
debt-to-GDP ratios below the 60%-threshold: Finland, the Netherlands, Ireland and Spain. Greece, 
Italy and Belgium all had ratios well above the 60% threshold, averaging respectively 104%, 108% and 
99%. While several countries saw their debt ratios fall before the financial crisis, these ratios increased in 
every country after 2008. The increase is particularly striking in the periphery countries. Between the last 
quarter of 2008 and early 2011, the debt-to-GDP ratio increased 57.6 percentage points in Ireland, 41.3 
percentage points in Greece, 32.9 percentage points in Portugal and 25.9 percentage points in Spain. 
Unlike Greece, whose debt troubles stemmed from fiscal indiscipline, the rapid rise in Spanish and Irish 
debts originated from the private sector [25]. Following the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis, these two 
countries’ governments were forced to bail-out the private sector (banking systems). Portugal’s debt 
crisis is caused by much the same problems as Greece: overspending by the government and an overly 
large and bureaucratic civil service. Consequently, as shown in Figure 1, the debt-to-GDP ratios of 
Greece and Portugal had been rising long before the economic crisis of 2008 (especially in Portugal), 
). We use quarterly data 
over the period 1999Q1–2011Q4, which are obtained from the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) Economic Outlook and Eurostat. 
                                                                                                                                                                       
capture fiscal policy and the debt interest burden. However, the deficit-to-GDP series is only available on an annual 
frequency, which would leave us with too few observations to conduct a meaningful econometrical analysis. 
4 Luxembourg is excluded from our sample, because too many series were missing. 
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whereas Spain and Ireland had been able to reduce their debt-to-GDP ratios and keep them below the 
60%-threshold before they had to rescue their banking sectors. 
Figure 1. Debt-to-GDP ratio in Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) countries. 
 
Notes: Debt data are not available for 1999. The red line captures the Stability and Growth Pact 
limit on government debt set at 60% of GDP. 
Turning now to the government-bond yield spread (Figure 2), most EMU countries enjoyed 
sovereign spreads with U.S. Treasury bonds close to zero and even negative (between 2005 and 2007) 
until the financial and economic crisis. While many countries experienced a slight increase in their 
sovereign spreads in 2008, the rapid increase in the risk-premia of periphery countries was initiated by 
the sovereign debt crisis in Greece in late 2009. These premia have continued to escalate, and reached, 
in the first quarter of 2012, 22.7% in Greece, 11.18% in Portugal and 3.2% in Spain. Caggiano and 
Greco [24] find that the correlation between sovereign spreads and debt-to-GDP ratios (especially for 
countries where the ratio is >100%) has increased since the financial crisis. Barrios et al. [6] find that 
an increase in general risk perception is more important in explaining rises in sovereign risk spreads 
than domestic factors. However; increases in perceived risk heighten the effect of domestic imbalances 
on risk-spreads during times of financial stress. The situation in Ireland is slightly different in so far as 
its risk premium peaked during the second quarter of 2011. The Irish government’s commitment to 
public-debt reduction and the ratification by Ireland of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union by referendum in May, 2012, eased Ireland’s access 
to funds. 
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Figure 2. Risk premia in EMU countries. 
 
Note: The risk premium is measured as the difference between a country’s ten-year bond rate and 
the rate on the ten-year U.S. Treasury note. 
In order to assess whether the sovereign debt crisis of one particular country, such as Greece, has 
affected other countries’ sovereign spreads and economic outcomes, we include the Greek risk 
premium or its debt-to-GDP ratio in our PVAR. While several papers in the literature assume 
contagion would stem from Greece alone [1,3], we also check the impact of shocks to larger 
economies, which have seen their sovereign spreads rise more recently, namely Italy and Spain. For 
comparison purposes, we also examine whether shocks to Germany (the largest economy in the EMU) 
induce the same type of contagion. Consequently, while our sample includes 11 EMU members, in 
practice, the PVARs discussed in the next section are estimated with only ten members each that are 
defined by exclusion of the country defining the “country-of-interest” risk premium.  
Because the surge in global risk aversion is a significant factor affecting sovereign spreads [6,16,26], 
our model also includes a measure of global risk aversion (GRA). At times of high financial market 
risks, investors tend to sell high-risk government bonds and buy less risky ones, leading to higher 
sovereign spreads in more risky economies. Our GRA measure is based on the method proposed by 
Espinoza and Segoviano [27] and used by Carceres et al. [16].  The price of an asset reflects both this 
asset’s returns and the price that “investors are willing to pay for receiving income in ‘distressed’ 
states of nature.” (p. 6, [16]) The index of global risk aversion measures the market price of risk. The 
GRA measure is constructed using the following formula: 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = −(1 − 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖) (2) 
where 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖  is the share of the market price due to idiosyncratic risk as a fraction of the actual 
probability of a negative event. The GRA index captures the market’s perception of risk at every point 
in time. The GRA measure is exogenously given and common to all the countries included in the 
sample. Moreover, insofar as the market price of risk is estimated using the VIX (the Chicago Board 
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Options Exchange Volatility Index) and the U.S. Libor- overnight indexed swap (OIS), the GRA 
measure also captures liquidity difficulties in financial markets. A rise in the index of global risk 
aversion implies an increase in global risk aversion. As shown in Figure 3, the GRA index captures the 
rise in global aversion observed after August, 2008, and peaking in October, 2008, after Lehman 
Brothers’ bankruptcy. After a gradual reduction in 2009, the index spikes again in December, 2009, 
when the Greek government announced that its debts had reached 300 bn euros and its budget deficit 
for 2009 was 12.7%, four times the level allowed by the Maastricht Treaty. The more recent increase 
in the last quarter of 2010 corresponds to the spread of the sovereign debt crisis to other EMU countries. 
Figure 3. Index of global risk aversion. 
 
Note: Authors’ own calculation based on Carceres et al. [17]. 
We again follow common practice and identify structural impulse response functions using 
recursive identification (through the Cholesky decomposition), with the variables ordered as follows: 
global risk aversion (GRA), “country-of-interest” risk premium, the debt-to-GDP ratio, the rate of real 
GDP growth, the rate of inflation and the other countries’ risk premium. The recursive order dictates 
that the other countries’ risk premium responds to changes in the other variables in time t. In contrast, 
GRA only responds to itself in time t and only with a lag to the other EMU-specific variables. After 
performing both selection tests and robustness checks and comparing the results at different lag lengths 
(see the brief discussion below for more detail), we estimate the system with four lags. 
Before we discuss the results, we briefly comment on the robustness of the results we report below 
to alternative specification choices. For example, in our analysis, we order debt-to-GDP ahead of GDP 
growth based on the logic that the level of debt is not likely to respond immediately to a shock in the 
growth rate of GDP, but with a lag, as government budgets respond sluggishly to such changes. 
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However, one could argue the contrary if automatic stabilizers immediately change the ratio. We 
considered this alternative ordering, but the change in ordering does not affect our analysis and 
conclusions. We attach figures for the alternative options we estimated as an appendix to our main 
analysis. For brevity, we include the additional results only for Greece. However, a full set of 
alternative results are available for Spain, Italy and Germany. Given the Appendix with figures only 
for Greece runs eight pages, the figures for the other three countries are available upon request, but not 
included here for some semblance of brevity.  
Other options we considered included varying the lag length, adding a long-term interest rate for 
each country (in addition to the risk premium) and different transformations of some of the included 
variables. With respect to lag length, we considered a lag length of five and six, but the results did not 
change to a large degree (though, with six lags, the statistical significance of the responses is obviously 
diminished). After six lags, the degrees of freedom are exhausted for the pre-crisis period. For our 
crisis period (defined to include 2008 to 2011, which we discuss further below) the impulse response 
functions do not change much with five lags in the system. However, the statistical significance of the 
responses becomes weaker, and stretching the lag length beyond five made estimation in the short 
sample impossible. Estimating with shorter lag lengths did not change the inference greatly, except to 
make the statistical significance of the impulse response functions more pronounced.  
We also estimated the debt-to-GDP ratio in the first differences and GDP in log levels (instead of a 
growth rate). These alternatives did not change the results substantially, nor did adding the ten year 
rate for each country (which might be included if one believes the level of a country’s long-term rate 
has a distinct effect on the system from the risk premium). Lastly, while we focus on the pre-crisis 
sample versus crisis sample for comparison, the Appendix also reports the results for the full sample 
period. Overall, changes to the PVAR model along these various lines did not affect our inference to a 
large degree, especially when comparing the pre-crisis period to the crisis period. Of course, as more 
data become available over time, a researcher will be less bound by the restrictions we face here in 
analyzing the crisis period, but we feel the analysis below offers a useful understanding of the spread 
of financial pressure across the EU, one that is relatively robust to typical variations in  
PVAR estimation.  
3. Results 
3.1. Shock to a Country’s Risk Premium 
In the first set of impulse response functions below (Figure 4), we report results from a PVAR 
estimated with Greece’s risk premium to gauge the effect of a one positive standard deviation shock to 
that country’s risk premium on the remaining ten countries in the sample (so, Greek data are excluded 
from the remaining variables). The motivation for such a strategy is to isolate the effect of a change in 
one country’s risk premium on the other members of the EMU. We estimate the PVAR system, in turn, 
for shocks originating in Spain, Italy and Germany, as we do for Greece (reported in Figures 5 through 7). 
Finally, since we estimate with a long panel (n = 10 and t = 39), we control for country fixed-effects 
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using dummy variables.5
Below, we discuss, first, the responses displayed in Figures 4 through 7 for the pre-crisis period 
(2001–2007). Then, we conduct the same exercise, but for the crisis period (2008–2011), to check for 
evidence of contagion effects. Later, we also analyze the response of the system variables to a shock to 
the debt-to-GDP ratio, again for the pre-crisis and crisis periods.
 Based on limitations to the global risk aversion variable, the sample spans the 
first-quarter of 2001 through the second-quarter of 2011. We compute the responses over a 10-quarter 
horizon. For inference, we report standard asymptotic standard errors for the impulse response functions.  
6
Figure 4. Pre-crisis response of EMU countries to a shock to the Greece risk premium: 2001–2007. 
 
 
Notes: Impulse response functions estimated from six-variable vector autoregression (VAR), 
controlling for country-fixed effects, and with identification achieved through Cholesky 
decomposition (see the text for ordering). Shock is defined as a Cholesky one-standard deviation. 
Dotted lines show the plus or minus two-standard error bands. Horizon measured in quarters. The 
sample spans the fourth quarter of 2001 through the fourth quarter of 2007. See the text for 
additional details.  
  
                                                 
5 Using dummy variables to control for country-fixed effects is equivalent to the within estimator commonly employed 
when estimating with panel data (since most applications have large n but small t). Furthermore, given that we estimate 
with a long panel, the fixed effects estimator is consistent. See Arellano [28] for a discussion. Of course, one could use 
a “traditional” method and remove the country-fixed effects via transformation, but as noted earlier, doing so in the 
context of a PVAR introduces potential mis-specification related to cointegration. See [12] for an example using a short 
panel. In the Appendix, we provide results for the PVAR estimated without fixed effects for comparison.  
6 In the interest of brevity, we eschew reporting the results for shocks to the other variables. Those results are available 
upon request.  
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Figure 5. Pre-crisis response of EMU countries to a shock to Spain’s risk premium: 2001–2007. 
 
Notes: Dotted lines show the plus or minus two-standard error bands. The horizon is measured in 
quarters. See the notes to previous figures for additional details.  
Splitting the sample at the beginning of 2008 is motivated primarily by the notable change in 
Greece’s risk premium at some point in 2008 (displayed in Figure 2). In addition, as the discussion 
surrounding Figures 1 through 3 suggest, anecdotally, the “crisis” began in full earnest in 2008. To 
check this notion statistically, we apply Bai and Perron’s [29,30] structural break methodology to the 
risk premium for each country in our sample. Bai and Perron [29,30]  provide a method for estimating 
the existence of unknown (a priori) breaks and significance tests for any found break date. We find 
evidence of a statistically significant break date in Greece’s risk premium in the fourth quarter of 2008. 
For Spain and Italy, we find a statistically significant break in the fourth quarter of 2007. For the eight 
other countries in our sample, a break occurs in seven of them at some point in late 2007 or 2008.7
3.1.1. Pre-Crisis Period (2001–2007)  
 
Hence, we feel that 2008 is an appropriate point to split our sample into the pre-crisis and  
crisis periods. 
As shown in Figure 2, EMU countries enjoyed similar, low sovereign spreads (the standard 
deviation for this period is 0.5% or 50 basis-points). Consequently, shocks8
                                                 
7 Table A1 in the Appendix lists the dates for each country in addition to Bai and Perron’s [29, 30] asymmetric 
confidence intervals. Only for Germany did we not find a statistically significant break around the crisis period. There 
are numerous applications of Bai and Perron’s [29,30] methodology in various economic studies. In the interest of 
brevity, we refer readers to Bai and Perron [29,30] for details of their method. For an explanation of the method for the 
practitioner, see Brady and Greenfield [31] Here, we use their techniques to support the visual evidence that something 
obviously changed with Greece’s risk premium, in particular, around 2008. A detailed  and lengthy analysis of the 
structural breaks with respect to the Euro-area is beyond the scope of this paper, though it would certainly make for an 
interesting extension of our current study.  
 to different countries’ 
8 Over the 2001–2007 period, one standard deviation in the sovereign spread equals 49 basis-points for Greece,  
52 basis-points for Spain, 48 basis-points for Italy and 47 basis-points for Germany. 
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sovereign spreads yield quite a similar response from the rest of the EMU. First, as shown in Figures 4 
to 7, debt-to-GDP ratios in other EMU countries are not significantly affected by a shock to sovereign 
spreads. We only observe an economic slowdown between the fifth and eight quarters following the 
shock. Shocks to Greece, Spain, Italy and Germany’s risk premia trigger a similar response from the 
risk premia of other EMU countries. A worsening of these four countries’ risk premium increases 
remaining EMU countries’ sovereign spreads by 8–9 basis-points the first quarter and up to 10  
basis-points at the end of the first year. Then, the effect progressively diminishes, until it becomes 
statistically insignificant by the end of the 10-quarter time horizon. We also find a similar response 
from the GRA index, which rises 0.2 basis-points after the risk premium shock. 
Figure 6. Pre-crisis response of EMU countries to a shock to Italy’s risk premium: 2001–2007. 
 
Notes: Dotted lines show the plus or minus two-standard error bands. The horizon is measured in 
quarters. See the notes to previous figures for additional details.  
Figure 7. Pre-crisis response of EMU countries to a shock to the German risk premium: 2001–2007. 
 
Notes: Dotted lines show the plus or minus two-standard error bands. The horizon is measured in 
quarters. See the notes to previous figures for additional details.  
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3.1.2. Crisis period (2008–2011) 
Unlike in the pre-crisis period, the response of EMU economies to risk-premium shocks from the 
four countries studied in this paper are not identical. This is partly due to differences in the magnitude 
of the shocks (i.e., standard deviations in the risk premium variable): the standard deviation for 
Greece’s sovereign spread (659 basis-points) is more than 20 times larger than the standard deviation 
of the German sovereign spread (33 basis-points). 
Figure 8 shows the responses of the six variables included in our PVAR model to a one positive 
standard deviation shock to the risk premium of Greece (equal to 659 basis-points). A worsening of the 
Greek risk premium increases the other EMU countries’ sovereign spreads by 10 basis-points in the 
first two quarters. This slight rise in risk premia can be explained by a comparable rise in global risk 
aversion in the first two quarters after the shock to Greece’s sovereign spread. The initial negative 
impact of the Greek risk premium shock on economic growth is consistent with rising debt-financing 
costs, as well as the rising debt-to-GDP ratio, which increases by 50 basis-points after one year, up to 
200 basis-points by the end of the simulation span.  
Figure 8. Response of EMU countries to a shock to Greece’s risk premium during the 
crisis: 2008–2011. 
 
Notes: Impulse response functions estimated from six-variable VAR, controlling for country-fixed 
effects, and with identification achieved through Cholesky decomposition (see the text for 
ordering). Shock is defined as a Cholesky one-standard deviation. Dotted lines show the plus or 
minus two-standard error bands. The horizon is measured in quarters. The sample spans the first 
quarter of 2008 through the second quarter of 2011. See the text for additional details. 
When the sovereign debt crisis originates from a larger economy, such as Spain (Figure 9) or Italy 
(Figure 10), the impact on the other EMU countries is more severe, since a much smaller shock to 
Spain’s risk premium (+107 basis-points, i.e., less than a fifth of the Greek risk premium shock) or 
Italy’s risk premium (+117 basis-points, i.e., similar to the shock to Spain’s risk premium) also 
increases the risk premium of other countries by 10 basis-points in the first two quarters. For both 
Spain and Italy, this rise in borrowing costs triggers an increase in debt-to-GDP ratios by almost  
100 basis-points after five quarters. The response then becomes statistically insignificant for Spain, but 
remains significant for Italy.  
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Figure 9. Response of EMU countries to a shock to Spain’s risk premium during the crisis: 
2008–2011. 
 
Notes: Dotted lines show the plus or minus two-standard error bands. The horizon is measured in 
quarters. See the notes to previous figures for additional details.  
Figure 10. Response of EMU countries to a shock to Italy’s risk premium during the crisis: 
2008–2011. 
 
Notes: Dotted lines show the plus or minus two-standard error bands. The horizon is measured in 
quarters. See the notes to previous figures for additional details.  
What if the shock (again, one positive standard deviation, +33 basis-points) originated from the 
largest EMU economy, which also offers AAA-rated assets, namely Germany? This scenario is 
investigated in Figure 11. We find that other EMU countries see their risk premia increase by  
10 basis-points over the first year, as Germany loses some of its appeal as a safe haven for investors, 
and this effect spills over to other EMU economies. Debt-to-GDP ratios in other EMU countries do not 
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increase as in the other scenarios considered earlier9
Figure 11. Response of EMU countries to a shock to Germany’s risk premium during the 
crisis: 2008–2011. 
. However, because Germany is a bigger player in 
the world economy, the shock to Germany’s risk premium (a twentieth of the shock to Greece’s risk 
premium) induces a larger and slightly more persistent drop in the other countries’ economic growth, 
and an increase in the global risk aversion index. This phenomenon might explain why other EMU 
countries would see their risk premia initially rise, as investors’ seek refuge in U.S. Treasury notes. 
 
Notes: Dotted lines show the plus or minus two-standard error bands. The horizon is measured in 
quarters. See the notes to previous figures for additional details.  
Overall, these simulations provide some evidence of contagion within the EMU, as shocks to 
sovereign spreads from periphery countries trigger large increases in debt-to-GDP ratios in other 
countries. There is, however, no clear sign of contagion to other countries’ risk premia, as these 
spreads increase only very temporarily during the crisis period, despite much larger shocks to the 
spreads of Greece, Spain and Italy. 
3.2. Shock to a Country’s Debt-to-GDP Ratio 
To further investigate the presence of contagion of fiscal imbalances among EMU countries, we 
show in Figures 12 to 15 the responses to a one positive-standard-deviation shock to the debt-to-GDP 
ratio of Greece, Spain, Italy and Germany in the pre-crisis period (2001–2007). We then contrast these 
responses with those obtained for the crisis period (2008–2011).  
3.2.1. Pre-Crisis Period (2001–2007) 
Because shocks to countries’ debt-to-GDP ratios trigger different responses, we discuss them 
individually. 
                                                 
9 One still needs to keep in mind that the magnitude of this shock is much smaller than the shock to the other three 
countries’ risk premia. 
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Figure 12. Pre-crisis response of EMU countries to a shock to the Greek debt-to-GDP 
ratio: 2001–2007. 
 
Notes: Impulse response functions estimated from six-variable VAR, controlling for country-fixed 
effects, and with identification achieved through Cholesky decomposition (see the text for 
ordering). Shock is defined as a Cholesky one-standard deviation. Dotted lines show the plus or 
minus two-standard error bands. The horizon is measured in quarters. The sample spans the fourth 
quarter of 2001 through the fourth quarter of 2007. See the text for additional details.  
Figure 13. Pre-crisis response of EMU countries to a shock to Spanish debt-to-GDP ratio: 
2001–2007. 
 
Notes: Dotted lines show the plus or minus two-standard error bands. The horizon is measured in 
quarters. See the notes to previous figures for additional details.  
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Figure 14. Pre-crisis response of EMU countries to a shock to the Italian debt-to-GDP 
ratio: 2001–2007. 
 
Notes: Dotted lines show the plus or minus two-standard error bands. The horizon is measured in 
quarters. See the notes to previous figures for additional details.  
Figure 15. Pre-crisis response of EMU countries to a shock to the German debt-to-GDP 
ratio: 2001–2007. 
 
Notes: Dotted lines show the plus or minus two-standard error bands. The horizon is measured in 
quarters. See the notes to previous figures for additional details.  
Prior to the crisis (Figures 12 to 15), we find no evidence of contagion between debt-to-GDP ratios. 
However, shocks to countries’ debt-to-GDP ratios trigger different responses in other countries’  
risk premia. On the one hand, a shock to Greece (Figure 12), a 390-basis-points increase in the Greek  
debt-to-GDP ratio, triggers a rise in global risk aversion and in sovereign spreads initially by  
three basis-points and by four basis-points by the third quarter. On the other hand, when the  
debt-to-GDP ratio shock originates from one of the other three countries, other EMU countries see 
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their risk premia decrease by around four basis-points. The decreasing borrowing costs indicate that 
other countries benefit from flight-to-quality. In the case of Germany (Figure 15), the fall in other 
countries’ risk premia is consistent with a “liquidity effect” (also found in [9]) in which the overall level 
of risk falls when a country, viewed as less risky by investors, issues more debt, causing a fall in the 
other countries’ risk premia. This liquidity effect could also explain the initial fall in the GRA index.  
With the exception of Italy, a rise in the debt-to-GDP ratio usually stimulates economic growth in 
other countries, as additional spending by these governments increases aggregate demand in the 
Eurozone. Perhaps the rise in debt-to-GDP in Italy is associated with structural problems (such as tax 
collection problems, lack of competitiveness), which have undermined economic growth in Italy since 
the 1990s. Finally, given the size of the German economy in the Eurozone, an increase in the German 
debt-to-GDP ratio has a stronger positive effect on economic growth (+4 basis-points at the end of the 
first year) in other countries.  
3.2.2. Crisis Period (2008–2011) 
A large shock to the Greek debt-to-GDP ratio (1,550-basis-point increase) triggers very few 
changes in other countries’ responses (Figure 16). Initially, countries see their risk premia fall slightly, 
as a consequence of capital flight from Greece (and the rest of the world, since the GRA index 
increases slightly in the second quarter). By the sixth quarter, economic growth increases and, 
subsequently, the debt-to-GDP ratio in other countries falls while global risk aversion falls. 
Figure 16. Response of EMU countries to a shock to Greece’s debt-to-GDP ratio during 
the crisis: 2008–2011. 
 
Notes: Dotted lines show the plus or minus two-standard error bands. The sample spans the first 
quarter of 2008 through the second quarter of 2011. The horizon is measured in quarters. See the 
notes to previous figures for additional details.  
When the debt-to-GDP ratio of a larger periphery country, such as Spain (Figure 17), increases by 
one standard deviation (1,080 basis-points), the remaining countries in the EMU see their debt-to-GDP 
ratios decrease by 200 basis-points at the end of the simulation horizon, probably due to a rise in 
economic growth and a decline in risk premia following the 5th quarter. The risk premia fall initially 
by 20 basis-points and, then, by 60 basis-points ten quarters later. We observe the same capital flight 
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from Spain as in the pre-crisis period; however, the responses are stronger (even accounting for the 
larger standard deviation here). This latter effect might be due to the negative response of economic 
growth in the first year. 
Figure 17. Response of EMU countries to a shock to Spain’s debt-to-GDP ratio during the 
crisis: 2008–2011.  
 
Notes: Dotted lines show the plus or minus two-standard error bands. The horizon is measured in 
quarters. See the notes to previous figures for additional details.  
A shock to the debt ratio of highly-indebted Italy (Figure 18) triggers no statistically significant 
response from the other EMU economies during the crisis period, possibly because Italy is considered 
“too big to fail” and the European Central Bank (ECB) will intervene. The ECB announced on August 
7th, 2011, that it would buy Spanish and Italian debt to stem contagion. 
Figure 18. Response of EMU countries to a shock to Italy’s debt-to-GDP ratio during the 
crisis: 2008–2011. 
 
Notes: Dotted lines show the plus or minus two-standard error bands. The horizon is measured in 
quarters. See the notes to previous figures for additional details.  
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As shown in Figure 19, a shock to Germany’s debt-to-GDP ratio (+610 basis-points) triggers a set 
of responses similar to those obtained for Spain. After an initial limited response, a worsening of the 
German debt-to-GDP ratio leads to a decline in other EMU countries’ debt-to-GDP ratios by 100 
basis-points the 6th quarter. Sovereign spreads also decrease slightly in the first year and continue to 
decline around the 6th quarter (approximately 20 basis-points). We therefore observe the same 
liquidity effect as in the pre-crisis period, but with a larger magnitude. Countries might also benefit 
from a drop in the GRA index. Finally, a larger German debt level seems to stimulate aggregate 
demand in neighboring countries, as economic growth accelerates during the first three quarters 
following the shock. 
Figure 19. Response of EMU countries to a shock to Germany’s debt-to-GDP ratio during 
the crisis: 2008–2011. 
 
Notes: Dotted lines show the plus or minus two-standard error bands. The horizon is measured in 
quarters. See the notes to previous figures for additional details. 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper, we implement a panel-VAR (PVAR) model for 11 EMU countries to examine the 
extent that a rise in a country’s bond-yield spreads or debt-to-GDP ratio affects the other EMU 
countries’ fiscal and macroeconomic outcomes. Using quarterly data for the 2000–2011 period, we 
find some evidence of interdependence and contagion within the EMU during the 2008–2011 period. 
Our estimations suggest that in the pre-crisis period, an increase in one country’s sovereign spread 
leads to an increase in the other countries’ borrowing costs and sovereign spreads, but does not affect 
their debt-to-GDP ratios. After 2008, the same shock to sovereign spread has a large effect on the 
countries’ debt-to-GDP ratios, if the shock stems from Greece or Spain. This suggests the existence of 
contagion. In the case of a shock to Germany’s sovereign spread, however, other countries barely see 
their borrowing costs rise, as Germany loses some of its appeal as a safe haven for investors. 
When the shocks affect debt-to-GDP ratios, we do not find evidence of contagion, but whether the 
shock improves or worsens the other EMU economies depends on the debt level of the country 
“shocked”. If Germany or Spain’s debt-to-GDP ratios increase, other countries benefit from a liquidity 
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effect and see their sovereign spreads and borrowing costs decrease. If the shock originates from 
Greece or Italy, then we observe no significant response in other countries. As pointed out by Caporale 
and Girardi [9], these contrasting results suggest that financial markets are able to discriminate among 
different debt-issuers. Moreover, we agree with these authors’ conclusion that the crowding-out effects 
of higher debt from Italy and Greece provides support for some fiscal discipline. Sound fiscal policies 
are indeed essential to the smooth functioning of the EMU. 
To better distinguish between economic interdependence and contagion, further research would 
benefit from using a panel-vector error correction model, whereby the short-term dynamics would 
capture the possible contagion and the long-term coefficients would capture economic interdependence. 
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